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Introduction 
The year 1960 was an tumultuous one in postwar Japanese history. 
Millions took part in violent demonstrations throughout the country. 
Members of the ruling conservative party saw "the writing on the 
wall" warning of a leftist revolution that would overthrow society 
and all that had been built up after the disaster of the war. The riots 
and uproar were sparked by the ratification of the revised version of 
the Japan-US Security Treaty, which had been signed in 1951 as an 
important element of the postwar agreement on the terms for peace 
between the former enemies. The revision of the security treaty had 
been worked out during year-long negotiations. After a stormy 
debate in the parliament and serious breaches of the peace, the 
revised treaty was ratified, but the one who was singled out as 
responsible for the tumult, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, was 
confronted by the wrath of a unanimous press and public opinion 
and had to step down. 
A decade later, the revised security treaty was due to be 
prolonged, renegotiated or abrogated. The political temperature rose 
with the approach of 1970. Newspapers and opinion polls evinced a 
people nervously waiting for what would happen. Would the riots of 
1960 repeat themselves? Pondering over international affairs, a 
group of journalists and scholars assembled in January 1970 to 
discuss the role of journalists during a four-day symposium. A 
number of well-known Japanese and foreign journalists were invited 
as rapporteurs, but the first to enter the scene after the opening 
speech was a scholar, Koosaka Masataka, professor of international 
relations at Kyoto University. Talking on the topic of "International 
Politics and Japan in An Era of Change," he analyzed international 
trends and developments and traced their impact on Japan. He 
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I argued that military power could no longer be used as a means of 
I solving conflicts and that the era of peace based on the 
balance of terror was over. According to Koosaka, the era of Cold 
War had been replaced by the era of "international domestic war," 
1 i.e. a war that was not a reflection of the international cold war being 
1 waged between the superpower blocs, but one with roots in 
~ domestic factors such as overpopulation, the food problem, and the 
I generation gap. A totally new approach to international politics was 
I now necessary, according to Koosaka.' ! What made Koosaka, who was not only a well-known political scientist but also an influential opinion leader, argue that the gap between generations had become one of the key factors behind "the 
I 
I domestic war" was only too obvious. Two years earlier the 
I international student revolt had shaken not only the countries of 
I Western Europe but also Japan. Waves of violence had swept over 
1 
I the Asian country. Riots and demonstrations made headlines 
I virtually every day. 
t At the beginning of 1970, when the riots of 1968 were still fresh in 
people's memories, and with new riots feared to be pending, the 
"international domestic war" described by Koosaka seemed to make 
some sense: the uproar of 1960 had been sparked by a foreign policy 
issue - the revision of the security treaty with the United States - and 
the riots and demonstrations of 1968 were also attributed primarily 
to the protests by young Japanese against the US war in Vietnam, 
even if they were also demonstrating against a society that they 
viewed as rotten. But 1970 came and went, and, to the surprise of 
many, nothing happened: the riots of 1960 over the security treaty 
were not repeated. 
With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see that Koosakals view 
was an overreaction. Despite his credentials as an eminent analyst of 
contemporary world affairs and an outspoken commentator on 
domestic politics, he seems to have misunderstood the essence of the 
"international domestic war" that it was reasonable to claim had 
actually taken place in postwar Japan. It originated much earlier than 
1968, the parties to this "war" were not youth versus the 
establishment, but the ruling circles against the opposition forces; 
and its main figure was a hero of Koosaka, Yoshida Shigeru, 
Japanese prime minister in 1946-47 and 1948-54. 
What can be called the Japanese "domestic cold war" originated in 
the country's defeat in the Second World War. Defeat led to the 
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second opening of the country, the first having taken place in 1853 
when it accepted Admiral Perry's demands that Japan end its 
centuries of isolati~n.~ The opening after the war meant that the 
country exposed itself not only to a heavy influx of foreign ideas, but 
also to conflicts bred on other continents and in other cultures. The 
foremost Japanese authority on the occupation period, Tokyo 
University Professor Igarashi Takeshi, has written of such a 
"domestic cold war" in postwar Japan that was a domestic reflection 
of the Cold War being waged between the US and the soviet blocs.3 
The occupation of Japan has recently been reassessed by American 
and Japanese scholars in an extensive research project. Their final 
report, which was published in 1987 under the title Democratizing 
Japan: The Allied Occupation, was edited by the dean of American 
historians of Japan, Robert E. Ward of Stanford University, and one 
of the foremost Japanese authorities on postwar Japanese history, 
Sakamoto Yoshikazu of Tokyo In his own contribution 
to the report, "The International Context of the Occupation of Japan," 
Sakamoto discusses the linkage between international and domestic 
factors in the creation of the setting for Japan's postwar policies. He 
argues that the allied occupation of Japan "transfused the Cold War 
confrontations of Europe and of Asia into Japan, but it did not 
directly reflect the international confrontation. It was 'deflected' 
through the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers [SCAP], 
General Douglas MacArthur in particular."5 
Thus, Sakamoto argues that the Cold War dividing the world into 
two antagonistic blocs was brought into Japan by SCAP, and he 
gives the credit for this to the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers, General MacArthur. The purpose of the present paper is to 
show that Sakamoto has underestimated the important role that 
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru played in the outbreak of "the 
domestic cold war" of postwar Japan. By introducing new conflicts 
into the Japanese polity, and by exacerbating conflicts that already 
existed within the Japanese political system, conflicts which in many 
cases did not have domestic roots but originated outside of Japan, 
Yoshida locked postwar Japanese party politics into a cage of bitter 
conflicts that only gradually subsided. 
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A Ruler of His Time 
Yoshida Shigeru occupied the post of prime minister for seven years 
and two months, an exceptionally long period for a premier in Japan. 
At the time he took office, he had behind him a distinguished career 
as a diplomat. Initially, his rise to power had been blocked by the 
Americans, but they later endorsed him as prime minister. As he was 
an outsider to the parties and lacked a footing in Japanese party 
politics, he based his position mainly on support from the occupation 
authorities. A symbiotic relationship between Yoshida and the de 
facto ruler of Japan during the occupation, General MacArthur, soon 
evolved. Early on, the US authorities had decided to make use of the 
Japanese government and authorities in the execution of policy 
changes in the occupied country, and MacArthur used the Japanese 
government and the prime minister as his instruments in the 
implementation of his policies. But Yoshida was also able to use the 
SCAP for his own purposes. He would blame the occupation 
authorities for reforms and changes that were unpopular, thus 
avoiding having to take responsibility for implementing necessary 
but unpopular policies. This pattern of dependence, which continued 
throughout Yoshida's tenure as prime minister, had been established 
by the time Yoshida formed his first government in 1946.~ c c o r d i n ~  
to Masumi Junnosuke, "Yoshida maintained his hold on the 
government because of the backing of MacArthur; MacArthur 
executed the transformation of US Japan policy through his hold 
over ~ o s h i d a . " ~  
( As prime minister, Yoshida negotiated with the United States and 
succeeded in ending the allied occupation of Japan by accepting 
conditions prescribed by the war victors. With the signing of the 
Japan-US Security Treaty in San Francisco in the aftermath of the war 
(1951), he allied his country firmly to its former foe and gave the 
United States the right to maintain military bases in Japan even after 
that country had regained its sovereignty. Yoshida accepted 
far-reaching limitations of Japanese sovereignty which met the wrath 
of the nationalists. What annoyed them most, perhaps, was the fact 
that it was actually Yoshida who had proposed the stationing of 
foreign troops on Japanese soil. His lack of a footing in party politics 
made him vulnerable to attacks by his political foes inside and 
outside of his party once MacArthur was gone. A few short years 
after Yoshida had returned home in triumph from the San Francisco 
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peace negotiations, he had to exit the political scene through the back 
door. He "was hounded from office under a hail of brickbats from 
both conservatives and progressives, who agreed, if on little else, 
that the prime minister was an autocrat who had bartered true 
independence for US security guarantees."8 
Yoshida and his policies continued to exert a pervasive influence 
on foreign policy in the decades to come. The path to national 
recovery that he chose was one of alignment with the Western bloc, 
reliance on the Japan-US security arrangements for defense, and 
concentration on economic development, and it became the basis of 
the so-called mainstream conservatism that has dominated Japanese 
government ever since.9 There was little room for Japan to pursue 
any independent diplomatic initiative, as the country had to act 
within the San Francisco political framework.1° 
In the mid-sixties, Koosaka started a drive for the rehabilitation of 
Yoshida. He published a large number of articles arguing for this 
cause, and when he compiled his articles in a book, it became a bible 
of sorts for Yoshida fans, whose number rapidly increased." Several 
factors were highlighted in the campaign to rehabilitate Yoshida. 
One was the reassessment of the postwar system that had begun to 
take place in Japan. In the face of such great changes in world politics 
as the US setback in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
a need was perceived for a fresh look at Japan's security 
arrangements thirty years after the signing of the US-Japan Security 
Treaty. As Yoshida was responsible for the treaty and considered the 
"father" of the postwar domestic system, it was natural that he 
himself come under scrutiny.12 Another reason for the revival of 
interest in Yoshida was that the economic success which the country 
was experiencing was attributed to Yoshida's postwar system. 
Yoshida was identified with the economism which had become the 
driving force behind the leap from economic recovery to rapid 
gowth.13 One scholar summarized a view held by many in the 
following way: "The Yoshida system made the rapid economic 
development of the postwar period possible. It enabled Japan, a 
country with 0.3 per cent of 'the world's land area and 3 per cent of 
the world's population to reach a situation where it now produces 10 
per cent of the world's GNP."'~ A third factor was connected with a 
nostalgic yearning for his leadership on the part of a Japanese public 
that was now being governed by grey figures like Prime Minister 
Suzuki Zenkoo and other contemporary politicians.15 ~oshida's style 
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contrasted starkly with what Henry Kissinger has described as the 
"understated" and "anonymous" style of those leaders who have 
I 
I represented Japan internationally.16 Koosaka was not alone in 
! arguing that Yoshida's policies had been beneficial for Japan, and 
I 
that he had been unusually far-sighted. Koosaka argued that I Yoshida's choice of policy line proved to be a most adequate one for 
Japan, and that the basic soundness of his foreign policy persisted, 
because it was "a remarkably wise (though unconscious) adaptation 
to the new realities of world politics in general and to the basic 
international position of Japan in particular."17 
The words of Koosaka and other devoted Yoshida followers did 
1 not fall on deaf ears. The negative image of Yoshida gradually 
1 changed, and by his death in 1967 he was no longer generally reviled 
I but instead generally respected. Many Japanese saw him as "the 
I father of postwar Japan." The antagonistic view of Yoshida and his 
1 policies which was adopted by many of his contemporaries, and 
which had forced him to leave office, was definitely on the wane. 
The rehabilitation of Yoshida continued after his death. The end of 
the 1970's saw the beginning of what was soon to be called a 
"Yoshida boom" in Japan which continued in the 1980s. This 
reassessment was a lopsided one, however, as it was based on such 
factors as Yoshida's "strong" leadership and role in laying the 
foundations of the economically impressive postwar Japanese 
system, and overlooked the conflicts referred to at the outset of this 
paper, which were also part of the Yoshida legacy. 
The Internalization of the Cold War in Postwar Japan 
In any given polity, conflicts are unavoidable insofar as they 
represent legitimate clashes of interests, and they are at the center of 
the political arena in a parliamentary democracy. Different interests 
are aggregated in parties competing in the electoral arena. In many 
cases, the immediate reasons for interest aggregation are pork-barrel 
matters, but political issues such as ideological differences are also 
common bones of contention. In Japan after the war, as in any 
country, some of the contemporary conflicts were part of the 
historical legacy of earlier periods. The problem of conflicts lingering 
on from prewar times was particularly apparent in the early postwar 
period. Bitter conflicts in postwar politics originating in the years 
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prior to or during the war set their mark on Yoshida's time in office. 
Contrasting affiliations with Seiyuukai or Minseitoo, the major 
prewar parties, had a pervasive impact on the politics of the early 
postwar period. 
After the war, when the new democratic system was being 
established, many of the politicians who came to prominence had 
been active before and during the war. A large number of them were 
purged by the occupation authorities. With the intensification of the 
Cold War, the United States shifted its policy from one of trying to 
break up the foundations of Japanese militarism to one of trying to 
rebuild Japan and make it a bastion against communism. This policy 
reversal was also linked to a shift in policy towards those members 
of the Japanese establishment who had been involved in the 
Japanese war machine. 
Nearly a hundred thousand politicians, bureaucrats, and busi- 
nessmen, who had been purged for wartime activities, gradually 
returned to public life and demanded a place in the sun again. A 
number of leaders from prewar times immediately turned against 
Yoshida, whom they viewed as having usurped power in coming 
into politics as an outsider. Strangely enough, the political foes that 
challenged Yoshida's grip on power were often members of the party 
that Yoshida chaired. 
Most conflicts in the early postwar period were of contemporary 
rather than historical origin, however. Some of the conflicts in 
postwar Japan were created by Yoshida in the sense that he chose 
solutions to political problems that damaged the vital interests of 
some quarters of society, some political party or party faction or 
some politician or group of politicians. One can also find cases in 
which Yoshida exacerbated an already existing conflict. With the 
fading away of conflicts that had originated before and during the 
war, conflicts originating in the postwar period took over the scene 
of contentions. Many of them related to Japan's relationship to the 
United States. The US had been planning its policies towards a 
defeated Japan before its capitulation, planning how Japan was to be 
integrated into the US defense system. In a program of 1944, the 
United States clearly spelled out its postwar objectives. These were 
two: "(a) Japan must be prevented from being a menace to the United 
States and the other countries of the Pacific area; (b) American 
interests require that there be in Japan a government which will 
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respect the rights of other states and Japan's international 
obligations."18 
Yoshida's treatment of these goals is significant. In his memoirs, 
he notes that "these objectives were, in essence, our own, from the 
moment the war had ended. Thus the fact emerged that, from the 
point of view of objectives, at least, we Japanese and the Occupation 
were in agreement."19 In other words, Japan took its cue from the 
outside world in adopting its foreign policy goals: the two broad 
objectives of the occupying forces became those of Japan as well. But 
in Yoshida's eyes, Japan had no choice.20 Japan's geographical 
position and demographic and industrial character made it 
vulnerable, and Yoshida continued the century-old search for a 
reliable ally or protector among the Western powers.21 As Japan had 
pursued and lost a war of aggression and had thereby forfeited the 
trust of the international community as well, Yoshida saw his foreign 
policy as necessary for a defeated country that would not be 
permitted to rebuild its military power, if Japan was to be able to 
return to international society. In the face of the massive military 
power of the US and the Soviet Union, it was neither possible nor 
particularly meaningful to maintain an independent military power, 
and neutralism was unrealistic in the Cold War conflict of the 
superpowers. 
The overriding goal for Yoshida during the occupation period was 
to overcome the national disgrace that the occupation constituted. 
The occupation "effectively meant that Japan became an American 
dependency, little different except in scale from the colonial 
territories of the US or the West European states."" Yoshida settled 
on the policy of being "a good loser" as that most effective in 
reaching this goal, and pursued an active policy designed to impress 
upon the West that Japan was willing to adapt to changed 
 circumstance^.'^ ~e saw his task as being to do his best in a situation 
in which he had no power to object to policies and acts that he 
deeply resented. "Being a good loser does not mean saying yes to 
everything the other party says; still less does it mean saying yes and 
going back on one's word later. It was obviously important to 
co-operate with the Occupation authorities to the best of one's 
power," Yoshida stated in his memoirs. His policy towards the 
occupation authorities was "to say whatever I felt needed saying, and 
to accept what t ran~~ired." '~ ~ e s ~ i t e  th  fact that he was prime 
minister, Yoshida had often no say in the making of decisions. As the 
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changes instituted by SCAP were intended to reshape Japanese 
society completely, it is no wonder that they clashed with the wishes 
of well-established centers of powers in Japan. Consequently, 
Yoshida had no choice but to clash with those interests himself if he 
wanted to remain in office. 
The constitution is one example of a radical change instituted by 
the occupation authorities, and was to be a focal point for national 
distress and conflict from the day of its inception. Vocal support for 
the constitution, and, in particular, for the literal interpretation of 
Article 9, has been the main battle cry of the opposition parties 
throughout the postwar period.25 
In the heady idealism that immediately followed victory, the US 
occupation authorities embodied in the constitution the idea that 
power politics had been one of the roots of the war and endeavored 
to eradicate this force. General MacArthurls objective was to institute 
a "complete reformation of the Japanese people - reformation from 
human slavery to human freedom, from immaturity that comes of 
mythical teachings and legendary ritualism to the maturity of 
enlightened knowledge and truth, from the blind fatalism to the 
considered realism of peace."26 
In his memoirs, Yoshida notes that it was clear the moment Japan 
accepted the Potsdam Declaration that a need for a revision of the 
Meiji constitution would arise sooner or later.27 Yoshida had been 
among those Japanese who fought with dogged determination to 
avoid the thorough rewriting of the 1889 constitution that the US 
authorities demanded after the war, but who lost and had to watch 
while SCAP wrote a new constitution. As premier, it was Yoshida's 
task to present the constitution to which he had vehemently objected, 
and which he had tried to prevent from coming into existence, as a 
result of the work of his government. He therefore publicly denied 
that the constitution was forced on Japan. "Speaking from my own 
experience as one of those responsible for its drafting," he wrote in 
his memoirs, "I cannot entirely agree with the statements that this 
postwar Constitution was forced upon And throughout his life 
he continued to be publicly loyal to the article that he had tried to 
hinder, and later wrote that he had "always held the view that 
Article 9 -the renunciation-of-war clause- does not need to be 
amended. And I still adhere to that view."29 
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Yoshida Shigeru and Conflict 
As prime minister, it was up to Yoshida to take upon himself and his 
government the responsibility for executing the changes that were to 
be made in the Japanese social and political fabric -changes which 
were decided not by the Japanese themselves but by US authorities. 
The Japanese government simply had to implement whatever the 
occupation authorities decided. The choice, if there was one, was not 
one for Japan to make. Thus, even if Yoshida was accused by his 
contemporaries of being responsible for decisions, in most cases he 
had no say and could not be held responsible for them. The main 
conflict lines of postwar Japanese politics were drawn by political / decisions made, not by the Japanese and their representatives, but by 
1 others. 
This fact is not to say, however, that many of the policies devised 
and acts taken by Yoshida himself did not contribute to the 
polarization of Japanese politics and heightened general political 
tensions. On the contrary. Under Yoshida, Japan experienced a sharp 
polarization between left and right. Many of his policies were based 
on resistance to communism and the labor movement. Having 
pursued policies which benefited the labor movement in the initial 
stages of the occupation, SCAP adopted a changed stance with the 
rapid growth of the movement and its threat of a general strike. 
General MacArthur warded off the general strike and began a drive 
to root out leftist elements. The United States drastically altered its 
Japan policy in 1947-48 from one of containing Japanese militarism to 
one of transforming Japan into an industrially strong ally with bases 
from which US forces could operate effectively to contain communist 
forces nearby." Yoshida saw no reason for objecting to the new 
policy, and followed suit. He perceived the communist threat as real 
and thought that what Japan should fear most was the possibility of 
a Communist revolution following defeat." His government 
initiated a purge of the Japan Communist Party leadership followed 
by the so-called Red Purge which was instituted, as the prime 
minister himself put it, to drive "Communists and their sympathizers 
from Government posts, press and ind~s t r ies . "~~ 
The conflict between conservatives and leftist forces, which both 
was symbolized by and centered around the constitution that 
renounced war, was worsened by Yoshida's severely anti-leftist 
policies. When the Cold War began in around 1947-48, Japan's 
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leaders, with Yoshida among them, quickly decided to follow the 
lead of the advanced Western countries. There was little time 
differential between the adoption of hard-line policies vis-8-vis the 
USSR by Western countries and adaptation to these major shifts on 
the part of the Japanese elites." m e  basis was the anti-communism 
that was the guiding star of US policy, and it was adopted by the 
Japanese leadership as national policy. Yoshida noted in his 
memoirs: "There can be no question to which of the two world 
camps -free or Communist- we are committed."" In retrospect 
Reinhard Drifte has laconically commented: "Japan's conservative 
leaders had few difficulties in accepting the 'cold war world', as they 
had no sympathy with communism at home or abroad."35 
Yoshida linked the activities of the Japanese communists directly 
to the threat to vital national interests posed by the world communist 
movement. In his memoirs he wrote: "Unfortunately, Japan's 
outward prosperity, and the vitality of our people which made this 
possible, have attracted the notice of Communist lands, and their 
efforts to draw Japan into their own camp and away from the free 
world have redoubled in persistence of late. The rivalry existing 
between the two world camps today may make this seem a natural 
state of affairs, but the Japanese people appear to me to be 
dangerously complacent in regard to the possible effect which 
Communist propaganda might come to exercise in our country."36 In 
July 1952 he tried to establish his own variation of the US House of 
Representatives Un-American Activities committee." A Subversive 
Activities Prevention Law was passed, and provided many of the 
control powers of its occupation period analogue. Many on the left 
fought Yoshida's proposed measures as representing a new version 
of the repressive Peace Preservation Law of 1925. The onus for such 
measures shifted after 1952 from the allied occupation authorities to 
the Japanese conservatives themselves with the consequence being 
that Yoshida could no longer hide behind the occupation authorities 
and blame them for unpopular policies. All the pent-up wrath that 
had been directed against the occupation powers now hit Yoshida 
with full force. He tried for a while to resist, but soon had to resign 
as prime minister. 
The most important factor in the fall of Yoshida, however, lurked 
in what was also his greatest triumph: the signing of the San 
Francisco treaties, which brought the occupation to an end. Yoshida 
handled this issue in such a way as to aggravate the division which 
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the campaign against the labor movement had created between the 
ruling party and the opposition forces. The protracted negotiations 
over the peace treaty had eventually led to an agreement. At the end 
of the negotiation process, however, the United States and the Soviet 
Union were not in agreement over the terms. Two options 
crystallized: Japan seemed to have the choice of signing either a 
"total" peace treaty with all its former enemies or a "partial" peace 
treaty that excluded the Soviet Union. Yoshida chose the latter 
option, immediately antagonizing broad strata of people in Japan, 
who were eager to end whatever smacked of the military and 
militarism and objected strenuously to anything other than a "total" 
peace. Even the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry, wholly under 
Yoshida's control, contained pockets of d i s~on ten t .~~  
Yoshida had to pay a price for the peace treaty, and to thus be able 
to bring a demeaning occupation to an end. In an assessment made 
by the foremost authority on modern Japanese diplomatic history, 
Uchiyama Masakuma, a number of reasons for the resistance to the 
security treaty that Yoshida was responsible for are given. According 
to the security treaty, the author wrote in 1980, 
"Japan is a countrywide military base for the United States from 
the strategical point of view. Japan's situation puts it in just the 
vanguard of the anti-Communist defense line of the American 
Forces. Superficially, Japan is an independent country, but since 
the defeat in war and American occupation and its sequel, 
actually she is a vassal state of the U.S.A 
The treaty was bound to stir up unpleasant emotions in a nation 
which, to a large degree, saw its modern history as a long struggle to 
resist foreign pressures in the form of unequal treaties, military 
threats, and economic sanctions. The fact that the Soviet Union and 
some other socialist countries did not sign the peace treaty meant 
that Japan's war with these countries continued in a technical sense, 
and Yoshida was therefore unable to win support from the leftist 
camp.40 But resistance was put up not only by leftists. The 
conservatives also rejected the treaty, as they saw it as nationally 
humiliating. Yoshida's critics on the right and on the left agreed in 
their view of the security treaty as a colonial treaty. In their eyes, the 
security treaty with the United States encouraged Japan to play an 
increasingly vital role in the US world strategic plan aimed against 
the Soviet Union, with Japan becoming "a springboard from which 
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the United States can launch attacks against the Soviet homeland 
[and] a shield behind which the US Navy can fight Pacific  battle^."^' 
To them, Yoshida's policies were outrageous, and nothing other than 
the expression of a submissive and US-dependent stance.42 But 
Yoshida's choice of a policy of dependence was a conscious one. He 
told a friend that he thought it better to be an American dependency 
than a weak independent country.43 
Yoshida's Conflictive Political Style 
In standard textbooks it is often pointed out that one peculiar trait of 
Japanese politics in the first decades after World War I1 was that 
many issues on the political agenda did not originate in domestic 
politics, but had their roots in international affairs. The editor of a 
comprehensive survey of the Japanese party system points out that 
inter-party conflict centered around foreign policy issues: 
One of Japan's most interesting characteristics is the lack of 
traditional cleavages common in the European societies. In terms 
of party support, Japan exhibits no sigrvficant religious, racial, or 
ethnic splits [...I Japanese electoral cleavages tend to be based on 
political issues such as support for the 1947 Constitution and the 
Japan-US Security Treaty, relations with the Communist bloc, 
and the continuing debate over capitalism and socialism as 
principles for societal organization.44 
This cleavage in the electorate was reflected in the party system. 
Formal left-right opposition has been open and unremitting in 
postwar decades. "When Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, it 
began a new national career without consensus on defense and 
security issues," Aruga Tadashi has claimed, describing the postwar 
situation as one of dissensus among leaders on fundamental beliefs 
about the international system, the proper Japanese role in it, and 
appropriate strategies for pursuing the national interest, caused by a 
desire on the part of the conservatives to revise the outcome of the 
peace negotiations that preceded indePendence.l" As already noted, 
the responsibility for this cleft introduced by the partial peace treaty 
lies with Yoshida and was a result of a conscious choice made by 
him during the negotiations for a peace treaty. Basically, this cleft 
was one of foreign policy and it is common knowledge that two 
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foreign policy camps have existed in postwar Japan, one consisting 
of the ruling conservatives and the other of the opposition parties.46 
But the cleavage was relevant to more than foreign policy. In fact, 
this divergence in foreign policy thinking also had a considerable 
impact on the political system as a whole, since it came to constitute 
the very focus and battlefront of national politics. "It must be 
remembered," Hans Baerwald has pointed out, "that the major crises 
of parlamentarianism in Japan have revolved around questions of 
I foreign policy.'147 The basic issue pertained to relations with the 1 United States, which had been set by the security treaty that Yoshida had negotiated and which was ratified in 1952, and according to which Japan was turned into a US partner in the eyes of its 
i supporters, and into a "US satellite" in the eyes of its critics. Yoshida's critics did not come exclusively from the ranks of the 
opposition parties, but were also to be found among the conservative 
rank-and-file, creating a situation of deep intra-party conflict. Many 
of the policies for which Yoshida was responsible, or policies which 
had been introduced by the occupation powers but which he was 
made responsible for, were anathema to many conservatives, and 
they attacked Yoshida ferociously, challenging his government 
vigorously. The conservatives were deeply split in their views of the 
security treaty. The clashes within the conservative camp often dated 
back to prewar times, when many of the basic policy profiles which 
distinguished Japanese conservatism in the initial decades of the 
postwar period had been drawn up. Those bitter struggles within 
Japan were a living memory and divided the  conservative^.^^ 
Conflicts and clashes within the parties often took the shape of 
personal conflicts. These were a result of the struggle for power 
within the parties or were elements of vendettas for perceived 
grievances and injustices. This was also true of Yoshida's party. A 
number of leading conservatives saw themselves as destined to take 
up the reigns of power in the party and openly challenged Yoshida. 
Many of these challengers had been influential in prewar times but 
had been pushed off the political scene because of their prewar or 
wartime activities, and fought bitterly for the right to re-enter the 
political stage. They challenged Yoshida for being both an intruder, 
without a personal basis in party politics, and a politician who had 
allowed national disgrace to tarnish the image of the fatherland by 
"paying the price" required for regaining Japan's independence: a 
constitution written by foreigners, disarmament, and a land reform 
that robbed the landlords of their property. They fought for 
rearmament through constitutional revision, and for a 
re-examination of reforms introduced under the occupation, and 
sought more independent diplomacy, all of these constituting 
demands that Yoshida bluntly dismissed.49 "Constitutional revision, 
rearmament, and compensation for landlords were not just 
abstractions; they were rectifications of what the purgees and their 
allies conceived as grievous wrongs. Securing these changes were a 
matter of honor."" These politicians whose careers had begun before 
the war challenged Yoshida's hold on power, and eventually 
succeeded. 
Yoshida created conflict, or exacerbated the conflicts that were 
brought into Japanese politics, with his political style -his abrasive 
style, his "one man" approach to decision-making, his tendency to 
prefer secrecy over openness, and his way of twisting what he said, 
malting for a disparity between his words and his deeds. 
Yoshida's abrasive style 
Yoshida is often characterized as having been a strong-willed 
political leader who pursued his policies with determination 
regardless of complications. He was evasive and equivocal, arrogant 
and curt, devious and disingenuous. A number of the conflicts that 
Yoshida was drawn into as prime minister were results of his 
abrasive style and strong language and his habit of using demeaning 
epithets when referring to others. On one such occasion, he called an 
opposition member of parliament an "idiot," which led to an 
opposition boycott of parliamentary proceedings and later general 
elections. On another occasion, Yoshida called those who did not 
agree with his view of the security treaty "sycophants" and "idiots." 
Another time he expressed the view that the lofty principles of 
idealists and pacifists were no more than the "babbling of a 
sleepwalker ." 
Yoshida's "one man" approach 
Yoshida was an individual with unusual personal qualities who also 
profited from extraordinary circumstances. During most of his term 
in office, his party commanded an absolute majority in the Diet, 
which was unusual. He was also able to maneuver in such a way as 
to utilize the power of the occupation to his advantage. His 
contemporaries referred to him as "One Man Yoshida" and many 
criticized his "almost arbitrary rulen5' Going it alone meant that 
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Yoshida disregarded the opinions and views of others. He did not 
care for party affairs but built his political power base on good 
relations with the occupation authorities and a loyal following of 
bureaucrats. When he was making the far-reaching decisions in 
foreign policy which still guide Japan, he was relatively unrestrained 
by parties or party factions." His alienation from party politicians 
disgusted these men. They rejected Yoshida's attempt at governing 
without the parties as it implied governing without them. It is 
significant that it was the widespread resentment over his "one-man 
rule" that eventually resulted in the defection of his outraged 
associates and ultimately in his downfall." Yoshida's attempt to play 
the Strong Man was initially successful, as he enjoyed the support of 
General MacArthur. But once the general was gone, problems started 
mounting. Yoshida's conflicts with party politicians worsened when 
the old guard gradually reappeared on the political scene. Not only 
were they his political foes because of his alienation from party 
politics: they also became his personal enemies as his policies 
threatened their political survival, and to exclude them from the 
corridors of power. One of the most infected affairs he was involved 
in concerned his attempt to outmaneuver a political rival, Hatoyama 
Ichiroo, who had been purged on the verge on becoming prime 
minister instead of Yoshida. Rumors immediately spread to the effect 
that Yoshida had been behind the order to purge Hatoyama, but the 
premier consistently rejected this accusation. Hatoyama did not 
accept Yoshida's denial and a bitter fight between the two men broke 
out, a fight that was to continue infecting the climate of domestic 
politics for years to come, and which culminated when Yoshida was 
forced to resign. 
The most striking consequence of Yoshida's go-it-alone, one-man 
approach to politics was his decision to accept a partial peace treaty 
rather than opt for a peace treaty with all Japan's former enemies, a 
decision which, as described above, alienated and angered not only 
the leftists but also rightist politicians and public opinion. The 
decision was his alone, as was graphically demonstrated by the fact 
that he was the sole Japanese representative to sign the security 
treaty on behalf of Japan. He later claimed that it signified that he 
had taken upon himself full responsibility for the treaty.54 He well 
knew what negative repercussions would sweep over Japan once the 
contents of the security treaty became known, but he had found that 
Japan had no choice but to ally itself firmly to the United States, and 
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he was prepared to face the political confrontations that were 
inevitable. His decision not to opt for an overall peace treaty was 
responsible for serious conflict becoming embedded in the Japanese 
polity - conflict which still is not settled and which is not likely to be, 
so long as the security treaty, as it now stands, continues to be valid. 
Yoshida's oblique strategies 
Coming from the bureaucracy, Yoshida had little understanding for 
openness and preferred secrecy. He also preferred the profes- 
sionalism of bureaucrats to the meddling of politicians. He was a 
bureaucrat who depended on the bureaucratic system rather than a 
proponent of a political ~r~anization."~ ~e shrewdly used, what 
Quentin Skinner has termed "oblique strategies," ways of setting out 
and at the same time disguising what one thinks about a specific 
object, leading to concealment of views in whole or in part for a 
number of reasons.56 
One such case was Yoshida's handling of the security treaty. 
Having worked for the most part in total secrecy with the United 
States in the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the peace and 
security treaties, Yoshida presented them to the Japanese people as a 
choice that was in fact a fait accompli, thereby introducing cleavages 
into Japanese domestic politics that would endure for decades to 
come. Although public opinion and many of his fellow politicians 
wanted Japan to pursue an independent policy line, Yoshida 
consented in the negotiations, on behalf of Japan, to the 
subordination of Japanese policy to the Cold War strategy of the US. 
He had concluded that, as an occupied country, Japan had no choice 
but to succumb to the wishes of the United States in order to achieve 
its top priority during the occupation years: political independence. 
When the treaty was presented to the parliament in October 1951, 
it was no more than an agreement on the part of Japan to allow US 
troops to stay on after the occupation. All the unpleasant details 
were found in a special, administrative agreement between Japan 
and the United States that was not made public until February 28, 
1952." A young nationalist representative and prime minister-to-be, 
Nakasone Yasuhiro, later said, "The security treaty was concealed 
behind the peace treaty, and the Administrative Agreement was 
concealed behind the security treaty."" The Japanese soon 
discovered that the ostensibly ended occupation was de facto a 
continuing one, a discovery which led to country-wide protests and 
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severe conflicts in the parties and public opinion. To make matters 
worse, with Yoshida's characteristic contempt for anything that 
smacked of popular politics, he "could not spill his guts" and explain 
the rationale behind the post-occupation tutelage, but hemmed and 
hawed.59 
Another case of Yoshida's conflict-inducing approach was his 
I( handling of the issue of rearmament. Throughout his premiership, 
Yoshida consistently objected to a Japanese rearmament, and he put 
I up a strong resistance to US pressure for a militarization of Japan. He 
wanted to be seen as the guarantor of a peaceful and unarmed Japan, 
I and on many occasions went on record to voice his opposition to 
1 rearmament. Nevertheless, in February 1951, his government 
I 
authorized the creation of the National Police Reserve Force of 75,000 
I 
men. Yoshida's purpose was clearly to establish a military force, 
I which was a great change from the thoroughly pacifistic 
interpretation of the article in the constitution renouncing war which I Yoshida himself had proposed.60 In this way, he took the first step 
towards rearmament without announcing it, and without the 
61 Japanese people realizing it. Despite the fact that he had verbally 
endorsed Japan's pacifistic policy and declared his refusal to bow to 
American pressures for a Japanese rearmament, his government 
initiated the creation of what was to become a Japanese military 
force. His double-talking approach to rearmament disturbed and 
puzzled his political enemies, who at least professed to being 
puzzled and angered. 
Yoshida's cautious policy of disguising the rearmament that he 
had initiated in the shape of a police force probably followed from 
his awareness of the likelihood that the Japanese would respond to 
anything that resembled Japanese militarization with protests. 
Ironically, his refusal to talk of the rearmament that he had de facto 
started, because of his desire to avoid a conflict with the pacifists, led 
to a clash with people on the right. Conservative politicians such as 
Hatoyama Ichiroo, Kishi Nobusuke, Ishibashi Tanzan, Koono 
Ichiroo, and several other prominent, charismatic figures claimed 
that it was a national humiliation that Japan did not have its own 
army, but was dependent upon US assistance for national security. 
They began to vigorously challenge the pre-eminence of Yoshida and 
started an anti-Yoshida campaign with the professed aim of 
rectifying Yoshida's disgraceful policy of US dependency, although 
elements such as personal rivalry and the desire for revenge, 
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accompanied by the rhetoric of nationalism and honor, were also 
conspicuous components of the campaign. When they succeeded and 
Yoshida was forced to leave, his departure led to a major easing of 
tension within conservative ranks, as it removed some of the 
smoldering, highly personalized conflict in which he was involved.62 
Concluding Comments 
In modern Japanese history, there are few examples of a politician's 
fall that can match that of Yoshida. Once a hero and the Strong Man 
of Japanese politics, he had to retire in disgrace, anger and bitterness. 
When the drive for his rehabilitation started a decade later, a number 
of factors were quoted in his favor. According to the "new" view of 
Yoshida that gradually evolved, his greatness rested on the fact that 
he had created the underpinnings of the postwar Japanese system. 
He was seen as the leader who not only gained Japan entry into the 
Western camp on the basis of its ties with the United States, but who 
also laid the foundations for the economic success and abundance 
that the nation had come to enjoy. Yoshida's importance was 
considered to lie first and foremost in the fact that he personally 
determined the course that Japan was to take in the postwar world. 
Another Yoshida legacy, which, while important, has tended to be 
overlooked, has to do with the conflicts that he introduced, 
exacerbated or prolonged. One reason for this oversight is the fact 
that Yoshida's party and Yoshida's disciples have continuously ruled 
Japan in the postwar period, and they have stressed the necessity of 
societal harmony -one of them, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkoo, even 
made wa, "harmony," the ideological slogan of his government. 
Another reason is "the neglected tradition" in research on postwar 
Japan, the fact that analyses have been guided by theories ignoring 
conflict as an element in politics and society.63 Researchers have 
overwhelmingly focused on harmony and thus disregarded conflict. 
Sakamoto argues that the occupation transfused the Cold War 
confrontation into Japan, deflected through the SCAP and especially 
General MacArthur. To give the occupation authorities and its 
supreme commander all the credit or all the blame would, however, 
be mistaken. The Cold War was brought into Japan in two stages, 
and Sakamoto disregards the second one. He deals with the fact that 
the US decision of 1947/48 brought the Cold War into Japan, while 
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overlooking the fact that the most important factor to establish the 
Cold War as "a domestic cold war" was Yoshida's subsequent 
decision to opt for a "partial" rather than "total" peace treaty, which 
gave Japan its peace treaty but not peace with all its former enemies. 
The allied occupation ended soon after the ratification of the peace 
treaty, but US bases and troops were to be found in Japan for the 
foreseeable future. Yoshida's critics saw little difference between the 
allied occupation and the new situation, and argued that nothing 
had really changed: Yoshida had ended the allied occupation by 
replacing it with one by the US. Regardless of whether they are 
correct in their views or not, Yoshida's decision meant that he 
polarized domestic opinion into camps that fought each other 
bitterly. His decision cemented foreign policy as the centerpiece of 
contention in domestic politics for many years to come. Even if 
Sakamoto is correct in his claim that General MacArthur transfused 
the Cold War into Japan, it was Yoshida who institutionalized "the 
domestic cold war" of postwar Japan with his conflictual political 
style. 
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